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INTRODUCTION (1)
Do unemployment benefits lead to longer unemployment spells? In
principle we expect so, since individuals can be expected to be more se-
lective concerning job offers the larger their out-of-work income. More-
over, standard search theory predicts that, under certain conditions, in-
creases in either the amount or the length of unemployment benefits
should lengthen the duration of unemployment.
The existing empirical evidence from US and UK microeconomic data
confirms this prediction, but the estimates of the effects of benefit
amounts on average unemployment duration turn out to be relatively
small (2). With regard to benefit length, the more telling evidence is the
presence of spikes in the exit rate from unemployment around the time of
benefit exhaustion, found for the US by Katz and Meyer (1990), among
others (3)(4). Existing estimates of the elasticity of unemployment dura-
tion to benefits may, however, be hampered by several features of the
data used in the literature. More specifically, many studies use a type of
7
(1) We wish to thank Daron Acemoglu, Alfonso Alba, Olivier Blanchard, Raquel Car-
rasco, Daniel Cohen, Jaume García, Guido Imbens, Juan Jimeno, Pedro Mira, Alfonso No-
vales, Steve Pischke, Enrique Sentana, Luis Toharia, José Viñals, and participants at semi-
nars at the Banco de España and MIT for useful comments. Raquel Carrasco and Francisco
de Castro provided very helpful research assistance. Any remaining errors are our own.
(2) Typical estimates for the US imply that a 10% increase in the amount of benefits
would lengthen average duration by 1 to 1.5 weeks (Moffit and Nicholson (1982) and Meyer
(1990), respectively). For the UK they range from 0.5 to 1 week (Narendrathan et al. (1985)
and Lancaster and Nickell (1980), respectively). See Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) for a
survey of this literature.
(3) They also estimate that an increase in benefit duration of 1 week increases aver-
age unemployment duration by 0.2 weeks.
(4) For Spain, a positive effect on duration of imputed benefit eligibility (not actual re-
ceipt, which is unobserved) has been found in a number of studies using cross-section data
from a 1985 Ministry of Finance survey: Alba-Ramírez and Freeman (1990), Ahn and Ugi-
dos (1995), and Blanco (1995), while Andrés and García (1993) only find an effect when
sectoral dummies are excluded. Also, Cebrián et al. (1995) find a spike in the exit rate in the
last 3 months of benefit receipt —with data on recipients in 1987-92—, though it is steep
only for those with entitlements up to 9 months. The latter three studies find small effects of
the replacement ratio on the hazard of leaving unemployment.
cross-section data covering a short time period, which has several impor-
tant consequences. First, the data refer to a stock of unemployed work-
ers, which implies that there is a higher probability of sampling individuals
with longer unemployment durations (the so-called stock sampling prob-
lem) and no benefits. Second, the end of a large fraction of the unem-
ployment spells is not observed,i.e. the spells are right-censored. At the
estimation stage, the combination of stock sampling and censoring re-
quires imposing non-testable assumptions on the shape of the likelihood
of leaving unemployment. Third, the probability of finding a job depends
on the state of the business cycle, but this type of data does not allow for
a proper control of this effect (5).
In this paper we overcome some of the problems just cited by using a
newly released dataset. We estimate the effects of unemployment benefit
duration on unemployment duration, controlling for personal characteris-
tics and business cycle effects, using a rotating panel sample of unem-
ployed men from the Spanish Labor Force Survey during the period
1987:II-1994:III. The panel structure of our sample has several advan-
tages. First, it allows us to analyze unemployment spells of entrants into
unemployment, which avoids stock sample biases. Second, we observe
those entrants over an extended period, which lets us reduce the extent
of right-censoring, not only of unemployment spells but also of benefit du-
rations. Third, the sample period spans a full business cycle of the Span-
ish economy, enabling us to take into account changes in aggregate con-
ditions properly.
The main drawback of our dataset is that it contains no information on
family income or on the actual level of benefits. Nevertheless, recent em-
pirical evidence suggests that the latter omission may not be so crucial.
More specifically, both Gritz and MaCurdy (1989) and Katz and Meyer
(1990) find that benefit duration has significantly greater effects on unem-
ployment duration than benefit levels. For instance, according to the lat-
ter, a given expenditure cut achieved by reducing benefit duration would
have twice the effect on unemployment duration as one achieved by cut-
ting benefit levels (6).
Since the late 1970s, Spain has had the worst unemployment record
in the OECD, with the unemployment rate rising, over our sample period,
from 16 % to a staggering 24 % of the labor force. These high rates have
come along with extremely long durations: in 1994, 56 % of the unem-
8
(5) A few papers using longer sample periods, like Meyer (1990) or Imbens and Lynch
(1994), provide estimates of business cycle effects.
(6) A related macroeconomic finding by Layard et al. (1991) is that benefit duration is
much more important than the replacement ratio (the ratio of benefits to the previous wage)
in explaining aggregate unemployment persistence in OECD countries.
ployed had been such for more than a year. Since the unemployment
rate depends on both inflows and outflows, studying unemployment dura-
tion alone is in general not enough to draw inferences about that rate.
The analysis of outflows is, however, especially informative in Spain be-
cause —as in many other European countries— unemployment has risen
more as a result of reduced outflows than of increased inflows.
Another interesting issue is the impact on unemployment duration of
reforms aimed at increasing labor market flexibility. At the end of 1984
fixed-term labor contracts with much lower firing costs than those at-
tached to permanent contracts were introduced in Spain. These contracts
have been widely used, and they now comprise around one third of all
employees. This institutional change contributed to a large increase in la-
bor flows, and it should have reduced, teris paribus, unemployment du-
ration. In this paper we test this hypothesis, obtaining favorable evidence.
As far as the empirical estimation is concerned, we estimate logistic
discrete hazard models by maximum likelihood. Using discrete models,
as opposed to continuous-time models is a natural choice in our context,
because we observe monthly durations. We specify both duration depen-
dence and calendar time effects in a flexible way. Moreover, we treat
benefits as a predetermined but not strictly exogenous variable in the
hazard model. We do so because the benefit variable in our dataset is an
indicator of whether the individual is receiving benefits or not at each
point in time while unemployed, which only provides censored information
on benefit entitlement. We also consider an extended version of the mod-
el allowing for unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with benefits.
In doing so we discuss the implications of introducing unobserved hetero-
geneity in discrete duration models with predetermined variables. We
proceed by specifying a reduced form process for benefits and by maxi-
mizing a joint mixture likelihood for the unemployment and benefit dura-
tions. The estimates of the model with unobserved heterogeneity do not
alter our main empirical conclusions in any significant way.
The paper is structured as follows. In section I we briefly present the
predictions of standard search theory about the effects of unemployment
benefits. The relevant features of the Spanish labor market institutions
and our database are described in section II. In section III we discuss the
empirical models and econometric techniques, and in section IV we pre-
sent the empirical results. Section V contains the conclusions.
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ITHEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
I.1. Unemployment duration and benefits
Economic theory predicts that, under certain conditions, both higher
levels and longer periods of unemployment benefits lower the hazard of
leaving unemployment, and therefore result in higher unemployment du-
ration.
The standard framework for analyzing this issue is well known, as
contained for example in Mortensen (1977). The representative worker is
assumed to maximize the present value of his lifetime utility, which de-
pends on income and leisure. Income when employed is equal to the
wage, and to benefits when unemployed. Benefits are received as long
as the worker has been laid off from a job and has not reached the maxi-
mum benefit duration (which depends on past employment history).
There is a stationary distribution of wage offers (jobs) and workers’
search activity is represented as random draws from that distribution. The
probability of leaving unemployment is the product of the probability of re-
ceiving an offer times the probability of accepting it. It is affected, among
other things, by the worker’s decision variables: search intensity and the
reservation wage. On the one hand, the probability of receiving an offer is
proportional to the intensity of search. On the other hand, the worker’s
optimal decision rule is to accept any wage offer above a certain reserva-
tion wage level.
Three key results concerning benefits emerge in this setup. First, as
exhaustion of benefits draws nearer search intensity rises and the reser-
vation wage falls, so that the hazard increases. Second, when benefits
are exhausted, the hazard rate jumps to a higher level (as long as income
and leisure are strict complements in utility), remaining constant after-
wards. Third, an increase in the amount or the maximum duration of un-
employment benefits raises the opportunity cost of search, thereby lead-
11
ing to a reduction in the hazard. This disincentive effect of benefits may
be countered by an entitlement effect: an increase in benefits increases
the expected utility from future, as opposed to current, unemployment
spells with benefits. Thus, for a currently unemployed worker without ben-
efits, an increase in the benefit level or duration raises the exit rate from
unemployment (i.e, employment becomes more valuable because it gives
right to now-enhanced future benefits). Since future events are discount-
ed for both uncertainty and time preference reasons, we expect this to be
a second-order effect for workers with benefits.
Later work has relaxed some of the assumptions in the standard
model described above, leading to qualifications of the predictions re-
garding benefits [see Atkinson and Micklewright (1991)]. For example, re-
ceipt of unemployment benefits may permit an increase in the resources
devoted to search by liquidity constrained individuals, thereby leading to
increased hazards. Therefore the prediction of a disincentive effect of
benefits may be partially or totally offset for certain individuals or periods
by entitlement or other effects, and assessing this becomes an empirical
question.
I.2. Duration, the business cycle, and hysteresis
Search theory does not provide an unambiguous prediction on the
sign of the relationship between the business cycle and unemployment
duration. Higher growth raises the probability of receiving a job offer, but
it also tends to increase reservation wages (1). Empirical work has not re-
solved the issue either. For example, with US data, Meyer (1990) finds
that a higher state unemployment rate raises the hazard rates of unem-
ployment benefit claimants, while Imbens and Lynch (1994) find that a
higher local unemployment rate lowers the hazard rates of young unem-
ployed workers (2). The latter paper is one of the few that uses a long pe-
riod sample. Thus, firmer conclusions may be reached as more work is
done on longer samples, like the one exploited in this paper.
Business cycle effects on individual unemployment duration are typi-
cally captured in empirical work by variables like GDP growth or the un-
employment rate (in levels and/or rates of change). Recent research has
12
(1) However, Burdett (1981) shows that a sufficient condition for higher job availability
reducing expected unemployment duration is a “log-concave” probability density function of
wage offers.
( 2 ) Also note that, in the macro literature on gross labor flows, Blanchard and Dia-
mond (1990) have found that in the US job destruction is much more cyclical than job cre-
ation, and that the absolute flow from unemployment to employment does actually increase
in recessions —although their computed hazard rate from unemployment is procyclical—.
pointed out a new channel through which the change in unemployment
would affect unemployment duration (the so-called hysteresis effects). An
increasing unemployment rate may reduce a worker’s chances of re-em-
ployment more the longer his duration is if, as suggested by Layard et l.
(1991, p. 365), it raises the share of recently unemployed workers in the
total pool of the unemployed and these workers are more attractive to
employers than the longer-term unemployed. This ranking behavior of
firms, proposed by Blanchard and Diamond (1994), could arise, e.g., from
human capital loss being increasing in unemployment duration. We ex-
plore these issues empirically for our sample of Spanish men below.
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II
INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AND DATA DESCRIPTION
II.1. Institutional features
II.1.1. The unemployment benefit system in Spain
As in most European countries, unemployment benefits in Spain are
of two types (the details are in Appendix I). The unemployment insur-
ance system (UI, Sistema contributivo) pays benefits to workers who
have previously contributed when employed. They must have been dis-
missed from a job held at least for one year. The replacement ratio is
currently equal to 70 % of the previous wage during the first six months
of unemployment and 60 % afterwards, subject to a floor of 75 % of the
minimum wage and to ceilings related to the number of dependants.
Benefit duration is equal to one-third of the last job’s tenure, with a
maximum of two years. The system’s generosity was reduced in April
1992 (see Table A.I.1) and again in 1993 (before the latter date, the
minimum benefit was equal to the minimum wage and benefits were
t a x - e x e m p t ) .
The unemployment assistance system (UA, Sistema asistencial)
grants supplementary income to workers who have exhausted UI benefits
or who do not qualify for receiving them, with dependants, and whose av-
erage family income is below 75 % of the minimum wage. It pays precise-
ly that amount, for up to two years. From 1989 onwards more generous
conditions were granted to workers aged 45 or older, and benefits were
extended until retirement age for workers aged 52 or older who qualify for
retirement except for their age (see Table A.I.2). The system was made
more generous in 1992, but less generous in 1993 (at the latter date, the
changes were as in UI). Lastly, there are special UA benefits for tempo-
rary agricultural workers in the Southern regions of Andalucía and Ex-
tremadura. Workers get 75 % of the minimum wage for 100 to 300 days
15
within the year —depending on their age and number of dependants—,
as long as they have been employed for at least 20 days.
Going now beyond the institutional setting, the actual coverage of un-
employment benefits has increased in our sample period, from 35 % of
the unemployed in 1987 to 55 % in 1993, with a secular decline in the
share of workers in UI as a proportion of benefit recipients, which goes
from 54 % to 50 % over the same period [Toharia (1995)]. For the popu-
lation we analyze in this paper, men between 20 and 64 years old, the
coverage is larger, around 67 % in 1992:IV, for example; and the propor-
tion of workers on UI is slightly lower, 48 % (1).
II.1.2. Fixed-term labor contracts
A key institutional change may have affected unemployment duration
in Spain within our sample period. At the end of 1984 new fixed-term con-
tracts were introduced, which could be signed for six months (2) up to
three years, and which entailed lower firing costs than the traditional per-
manent contracts (12 days of wages per year of service as opposed to 20
days if the permanent employee’s dismissal is ruled fair in court and 45
days if ruled unfair). This change caused a swift increase in the propor-
tion of temporary employees, from 15 % in 1987 to 34 % in 1994. The
rate is slightly lower among men (32 % in 1994), higher among the young
(58 % for those aged 20-29), and higher in agriculture and construction
(around 58 %) than in industry and services (around 28 %). The tempo-
rary employment rate grew steadily over the sample period. The most di-
rect impact of this change has been an increase in labor turnover rates.
We estimate the impact of temporary employment on unemployment out-
flow rates in sectionIV.
II.2. The data
The data we use come from the recently released rotating panel of
the Spanish Labor Force Survey [Encuesta de Población Activa: Estadís -
tica de Flujos (EPA)]. The EPA is conducted every quarter on all mem-
bers of around 60,000 households. One sixth of the sample is renewed
quarterly and hence we can observe the labor market situation of an indi-
vidual for up to six quarters. Some retrospective questions such as, for
16
(1) The data actually refer to the 20-59 year-old group, due to data availability.
(2) In April 1992 this minimum was raised to one year.
example, how long the individual has been in the current job, or how long
he has been looking for one, are also asked.
The EPA started in its current form in 1987:II and we use the waves
up to 1994:III. These 30 quarters span a complete cycle of the Spanish
economy. This data set therefore has two important features. First, we
can observe entrants into unemployment, which avoids stock sample bi-
ases. Second, we observe entrants over an extended period of time. This
allows us to study the influence of personal characteristics, in particular of
benefit duration, taking into account changes in aggregate conditions, so
that we can assess the relative importance of these factors.
The unemployed are asked each quarter whether they are receiving
any unemployment benefits (without distinguishing between UI and UA).
From their answers we construct a duration of benefits variable, which is
a censored entitlement to benefits variable since it only coincides with en-
titlement for workers with longer unemployment duration than benefit du-
ration. There is no information on the level of benefits.
In contrast to the cross-sectional EPA, the rotating panel —as cur-
rently released— only includes individuals over 16 years of age and does
not provide information on region of residence or family situation (except
for marital and head-of-household status). Given this fact, we have fo-
cused on men, since for understanding married women’s behavior it is
particularly important to know the labor market situation of their husbands
and the number and age of their children. We also exclude from our sam-
ple men aged 16 to 19 years old, given the instability of their attachment
to the labor market, and men aged 65 or older, due to the importance of
transitions to retirement at those ages. This leaves us with men aged 20
to 64 (3).
Our initial sample included 1,636,094 men. After filtering the sample
(see Appendix 2) we obtain 60,036 unemployment spells of which 27,382
are for entrants into unemployment, that is, people actually interviewed
during the quarter in which their spell started. Of those entrants only
1.37% are individuals without previous work experience. Since these are
a tiny group for which sectoral variables are not available, they are ex-
cluded from the sample in the econometric estimation. Sample frequen-
cies of individual variables are provided in Tables A.II.1 and A.II.2.
We consider as unemployed a broader group than the one defined by
the standard Labor Force Survey definition. We exclude those individuals
we take as being genuinely out of the labor force, namely those who de-
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(3) The aggregate unemployment rate of men aged 20 years old or more, over the pe-
riod 1987-1994, was 14 %.
clare themselves as either being out of the labor force throughout the ob-
served period, being a full-time student, or having no work experience
and not to be looking for a job. But we include as being unemployed
those classified as out of the labor force during some quarters, which is
not unreasonable having excluded women. An advantage of this criterion
is that the transitions we look at are always from unemployment (or non-
employment) to employment, rather than to non-participation.
II.3. A first look at empirical hazards, the business cycle,
and benefits
We can get a first impression of the influence of the business cycle on
the probability of leaving unemployment by examining the evolution over
time of the sample probability of finding a job. Namely, for each quarter
we evaluate the ratio of the number of individuals who find a job during
that quarter to the total number of unemployed at the beginning of the
quarter. This probability is displayed in Figure 1. It clearly mimics the pat-
tern of Spanish economic activity, as captured by the quarterly growth of
GDP line in the graph.
Another measure of the effect of the business cycle is given by a
comparison of the empirical hazards in a good year (for example 1989)
with those in a bad year (for example 1992). The empirical hazard for a
particular number of months is the proportion of individuals unemployed
for at least that number of months who find employment in exactly that
number of months. In Figure 2 we represent those empirical hazards.
Again, the importance of the business cycle is clear: unemployed workers
in 1989 were much more likely to leave unemployment than those unem-
ployed in 1992, specially at the beginning of their spell.
In order to examine the effect on empirical hazards of benefit receipt
in a given month, we now restrict the sample to include only those individ-
uals who are observed when entering unemployment, for the reasons dis-
cussed above. These hazards are represented in Figure 3. The no-bene-
fits line includes workers who never received benefits and also those who
received them at some point, but for a period shorter than the unemploy-
ment spell length under consideration (4). We can see that, up to the
ninth month of unemployment, individuals not receiving benefits have a
significantly higher hazard than those receiving benefits, and markedly so
during the first five months. In addition, we present in Figure 4 the haz-
18
( 4 ) Empirical hazard rates for workers who never receive benefits (not shown) are
very similar to the no-benefits line in Figure 3.
ards for the group of men aged 30 to 44, previously employed in the con-
struction sector, and without a university degree. This is a relatively ho-
mogeneous group and hence the comparison of the two hazard lines pro-
vides more robust evidence of the effect of benefits. As Figure 4 shows,
for the first six months of the unemployment spell the difference between
the hazards for workers with and without benefits is large. For example,
an individual without benefits who has remained unemployed for at least
three months has a probability of leaving unemployment during his third
month of unemployment of 25 %, as opposed to only 11 % for a compa-
rable individual receiving benefits.
A feature of the data revealed by Figures 3 and 4 is that the differ-
ence between the two empirical hazard lines (associated with a certain
characteristic, in this case receiving versus not receiving benefits) is not
constant. As a result, it will be important to allow for interactions between
duration dependence and benefit status in the specification of the empiri-
cal models in the next section.
The observed decreasing pattern in aggregate hazards (like in Fig-
ures 2 and 3) is partly due to the aggregation of groups of individuals with
different exit rates. Once we estimate an econometric model controlling
for personal characteristics, we should be able to separate out effects on
the hazards due to observed heterogeneity from those due to a combina-
tion of genuine state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity (such
as variation in family income or in unobserved human capital).
19
III
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND ECONOMETRIC TECHNIQUES
III.1. Basic models
The individuals in our dataset are asked for up to six consecutive
quarters whether they are employed or not, and how many months they
have been in the current state. They are also asked whether they are cur-
rently receiving unemployment benefits or not. From this information we
can construct complete or incomplete unemployment durations (in
months) for individuals entering unemployment at the time of the first in-
terview or later. Individuals who abandon the sample are supposed to do
so at the end of the quarter covered by the interview. This allows us to
calculate monthly empirical hazards on the basis of complete durations of
entrants and the surviving non-censored samples for up to 17 months.
Our information also lets us construct the duration of benefit entitlement
for individuals whose unemployment duration exceeds their benefit dura-
tion. Otherwise, we only observe the event that benefit entitlement is at
least as long as unemployment duration. In our analysis we treat unem-
ployment duration (T) and benefit entitlement duration (B) as discrete ran-
dom variables that are subject to censoring. Unemployment duration is
right censored when the individual is still unemployed at the time of leav-
ing the sample. Benefit entitlement duration has a different type of cen-
soring since its observability depends on it being shorter than unemploy-
ment duration.
Let C be the number of periods the individual is in the sample. In our
database C is at least 2 quarters but not greater than 6 quarters. We ob-
serve T if T < C, otherwise we only observe the event that T  C. More-
over, we observe B if B < T < C. We assume that T and B are indepen-
dent of C, which is not an unreasonable assumption.
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This observational plan motivates us to use, as the basis for our em-
pirical analysis of the relationship between T and B, the following hazard
functions:
The function 0( t ) gives the probability of being unemployed for exact-
ly t months relative to the group of individuals who have been unem-
ployed for at least t months and do not receive benefits at t. On the other
hand, 1( t ) gives a similar probability for individuals who are unemployed
for t periods or more, but are still receiving benefits at t.
The comparison between 0( t ) and 1( t ) provides a meaningful ba-
sis for studying a causal effect of B on T because both probabilities
are conditional upon being unemployed for t pe iods. In effect, regres-
sion or correlation analysis between T and B would be difficult to in-
terpret in causal terms. The reason is that the limitation in time of ben-
efit entitlement creates an association between being on benefits and
observing shorter unemployment durations which is unrelated to the
causal effect of substantive interest. Since C is independent of T a n d
B , in what follows the conditioning on C > t is omitted to simplify the
p r e s e n t a t i o n .
In order to clarify the nature of our analysis, let us discuss how we
would proceed if we could observe benefit entitlement for all workers. If
entitlement were not a censored variable at B  T, the following condition-
al hazard functions would be identified for any entitlement s:
In our dataset h(t,s) is identified for s < t but not for s  t . For exam-
ple, with B = 3, h(1,3), h(2,3), and h(3,3) are not identified. So we cannot
observe how the hazard rate for workers with benefits changes as the
time of benefit exhaustion approaches. Notice that 0(t) and 1(t) are lin-
ear combinations of h(t,s):
h(t, s) = P (T = t T‡ t, B = s)
f 0(t) = P(T = t T ‡ t, B < t, C > t)
f 1(t) = P(T = t T ‡ t, B ‡ t, C > t)
22
where S is the maximum value of B.
A simple but restrictive specification under which knowledge of o(t)
and 1(t) suffices to determine h(t,s) is to assume that at any t there are
only two possible hazard rates depending on whether individuals receive
benefits or not, for example because there are only two search intensi-
ties. In other words:
This two-regime hazard model is a restricted version of the standard
model described in section I. The latter predicts that, for two individuals
with benefits at a given t, the one with shorter benefits has a greater haz-
ard than the one with longer benefits, whereas the former model as-
sumes that the two are equal. This assumption is not testable, though,
because we do not observe B for individuals with B  T.
Nevertheless, this model does imply some testable restrictions for our
dataset. In effect, since the h(t,s) are identified for t > s, we could in prin-
ciple test the hypothesis that they are all constant for any given t. Specifi-
cally we could test the following restrictions:
We shall however not test these restrictions. The reason is that a pri-
ori we do not believe in the two-regime model, and so, even if the
testable restrictions were accepted, we would still expect the non-testable
h(t, 0) = h(t, 1) t = 2, , 17
h(t, 1) = h(t, 2) t = 3, , 17
h(t, 15) = h(t, 16) t = 17
h(t, s) = 
f 1(t) for s ³ t
f 0(t) for s < t
f 0(t) = 
h(t, s) P (T ³ t B = s) P(B = s) S
s=0
t–1
P (T ³  t B = l) P(B = l)S
l=0
t–1
f 1(t) = 
h(t, s) P (T ³ t B = s) P(B = s) S
s=t
S
P (T ³  t B = l) P(B = l)S
l=t
S
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restrictions not to hold. Instead, we shall directly model 0( t ) and 1( t ) ,
which have a straightforward interpretation. Note that by looking at the ef-
fect of benefit entitlement on unemployment duration through a compari-
son of 0(t) and 1(t) we are likely to underestimate the effect of benefits
on duration if the two-regime model does not hold. Indeed, we may ex-
pect the hazards for workers with and without benefits to begin to ap-
proach each other before benefit exhaustion, as the former change their
behavior in anticipation of the arrival of the exhaustion date (1).
Given the two-regime model it would be possible to reconstruct the
conditional distributions of unemployment durations for a given level of
benefit entitlement. In effect, we have:
from which we could, for example, calculate the median unemployment
duration for a given value of B, or changes in median duration from a
change in benefit entitlement:
However the distributions {T | B = s} do not really exist in our data,
and they could only be identified owing to a functional form assumption
like the two-regime model. Therefore, we shall emphasize in our empiri-
cal analysis the modelling of 0(t) and 1(t), for which we have direct
counterparts in the data.
A minor point is that in our empirical analysis we redefine 0(t) as
to take into account that while T is observed at monthly intervals B i only
observed at quarterly intervals (see Appendix 2). Obviously, this redefini-
tion has no consequences for the relation of 0(t) and 1(t) to the two-
regime model.
In addition to benefits, our analysis is also conditional on age, educa-
tion, head of household status, industry, and year variables. Alternatively,
year and industry dummies are replaced by aggregate and sectoral eco-
f 0(t) = P(T = t T ³  t, B < t – 2)
D  (s) = med (T B = s + 1) – med (T B = s)
P(T > t B = s) = 1 – h(k, s)     (t = 1, 2, )P
k=1
t
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( 1 ) As mentioned above, 0(t) is a linear combination of the hazards h(t, t–m) f o r
m = 1, ..., t. We would expect h(t, t–m) < h(t, t–q) for m < q.
nomic variables. The parametric models that we consider are logistic haz-
ards of the form
[III.1]
where the new symbols are as follows: x(t) is the vector of conditioning
individual, sectoral, and aggregate variables, some of which are time-in-
variant like education, while others like the aggregate economic variables
are time-varying. The variable (t) is the binary indicator of whether the
individual still has benefits in t or not:
F denotes the logistic cumulative distribution function:
In addition, 0(t) is an unrestricted parameter specific of each t that cap-
tures flexible additive duration dependence, and 1(t), 2(t), and 3(t) are
polynomials in log t whose purpose is to capture interaction effects be-
tween duration and conditioning variables (2).
In our model b ( t ) is a predetermined variable while the remaining
time-varying variables in x(t) are strictly exogenous. This means that the
probability in [III.1] should be understood as being conditional on the en-
tire path of x(t) and the values of b(t) up to t, but not on b(t + 1), b(t + 2),
etc. Namely we assume:
We need to allow for feedback from T to b(t) since we may expect
that forecasts of the hazard at t would be improved by using b(t + 1) or
other leads of the benefit indicator. Note that b(t) would only be exoge-
nous if the two-regime model were to hold.
A hazard function in which all the conditioning variables x(t) are strict-
ly exogenous corresponds to a conditional distribution of durations given
the full stochastic process for x(t). By contrast, in the predetermined case
P T = t T ³ t, b(1), , b(t), x(1), , x(¥ )  = PT = t T ³ t, b(t), x(t)
F(u) = e
u
/ 1 + e
u
b(t) = 1 B ³  t
f t, b(t), x(t)º  P T = t T ³  t, b(t), x(t)
= F q 0(t) + q 0(t) b(t) + q 2(t) x(t) + q 3(t) b(t) x(t)
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(2) Note that (t, b(t), x(t)) is just a common notation for 0(t, x(t)) and 1(t, x(t)):
(t, b(t),x(t)) º [1 – b ( t )] 0(t, x(t)) +b(t) 1( t , x ( t ) ) , where we specify 0( t , x ( t ) ) =F [ 0(t) + 2(t) x(t)] ,
and 1(t, x(t)) = F [ 0(t) + 1(t) + 2(t) x(t) + 3(t) x(t)].
we are effectively considering a sequence of hazard functions corre-
sponding to different conditional distributions of durations. However, in
the absence of unobserved heterogeneity, conditional inference is still
possible, and we can rely on the same likelihood estimation criterion un-
der both assumptions. The interpretation of the criterion, however, differs
in each case: while with strictly exogenous variables the criterion below is
the actual conditional likelihood of the data, with predetermined variables
it can only be regarded as a partial likelihood [see Lancaster (1990, pp.
23-31) for a discussion of these issues].
A discrete duration model can be regarded as a sequence of binary
choice equations (with cross-equation restrictions) defined on the surviv-
ing population at each duration. This provides a useful perspective, for
both statistical and computational reasons, that has been noted by a
number of authors [cf. Kiefer (1987), Narendranathan and Stewart
(1993), Sueyoshi (1995), and Jenkins (1995)]. It is also a straightforward
way of motivating the estimation criterion for a duration model with prede-
termined variables.
To see this, let Ti
0 denote the observed censored duration variable, so
that
and let ci denote the indicator of lack of censoring:
Moreover, let Yti be a (0,1) variable indicating whether the observed dura-
tion equals t or not:
Then the conditional log-likelihood of the sample for Yti given Ti
0  t
is of the form
where N is the number of unemployment spells in the sample, and
f i t  = f  t, bi t , xi t
Lt = 1 Ti
0
³  t ciYti log f i t  + 1 – ciYti  log 1 – f i tS
i=1
N
Yti = 1 Ti
0
 = t
ci = 1 Ti < Ci
TI
0
 = 
Ti if Ti < Ci
Ci otherwise
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Combining the Lt for all observed durations, we obtain our estimating
criterion, which can be written as follows:
[ I I I . 2 ]
where is the vector of parameters to be estimated and t is the largest
observed duration.
We estimate by maximizing the partial likelihood L( ). Notice that
L( ) is of the same form as a standard log-likelihood for censored dis-
crete duration data with strictly exogenous variables, although with a dif-
ferent interpretation when conditioning on predetermined variables. In the
absence of cross restrictions linking the parameters with those in the
benefit indicator process, the partial likelihood estimates of will be
asymptotically efficient.
III.2. Models with unobserved heterogeneity
The economic interpretation of the coefficients in model [III.1] in the
previous section is likely to be hampered by unobserved heterogeneity.
Aside from the problem of censoring in the benefit entitlement variable
that we discussed above, in our sample there are unobserved differences
in family income and in the amount of benefits received. Moreover, indi-
viduals with and without benefits may differ in ways that we do not ob-
serve. For example, there may be correlation between benefits and unob-
served human capital variables.
Such unobserved heterogeneity is likely to bias downwards the effect
of benefits on the exit rates, and to introduce spurious negative duration
dependence. In the absence of better data it is unlikely that much more
progress can be made on these issues. However, it is still possible to
generalize the standard specification by making the analysis conditional
on an unobserved variable u with a known distribution independent of the
exogenous variables. Following the work of Heckman and Singer (1984),
the recent econometric literature has emphasized the case where u is a
discrete random variable with finite support, thus giving rise to a mixture
model. This approach is attractive because it is flexible, and also because
by letting the support of u grow with sample size it is possible to establish
L q = LtS
t=1
t
= 1 – ci  log 1 – f i t  + ci log 1 – f i t  + log f i Ti
0S
t=1
Ti–1
0
å
t=1
Ti
0
S
i=1
N
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asymptotic properties for the estimators with respect to a model with an
unspecified distribution for u.
Here we also follow this approach. In our case, the situation is funda-
mentally altered when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced, however,
because we are conditioning on a predetermined variable. Unlike in the
model with only strictly exogenous variables, we cannot just consider a
mixture version of [III.2], since [III.2] is in our case a partial likelihood. In
fact, by introducing unobserved heterogeneity, b ( t ) becomes fully en-
dogenous and we can no longer condition on it. We therefore proceed by
specifying a reduced form process for b(t) given u. In this way we can al-
low for unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with benefits but un-
correlated with the exogenous variables. This procedure plays a role that
is similar to selectivity corrections based on an auxiliary selectivity equa-
tion in linear models. A formalization of these issues is presented in the
following subsections.
III.2.1. Unobserved heterogeneity in discrete duration models with
predetermined variables
The joint distribution of the complete paths of Yt and bt = b(t) given the
paths of the strictly exogenous variables (which are omitted for simplicity)
can be factorized as follows
where
and we use the notation Yt = (Y1, ..., Yt) and b
t = (b1, ..., bt).
Under strict exogeneity, that is, given Granger non-causality,
and ƒ1 becomes the conditional likelihood of Y given b . Otherwise, it is
just a partial likelihood. But in either case we can conduct inferences on
the parameters in ƒ1 disregarding ƒ2, provided those parameters are
identified in ƒ1 alone.
ƒ2 = ƒ b1, , bt
ƒ1 = ƒ Yt  Y
t –1
, b
t
  ƒ Y1 b1
ƒ2 = ƒ bt  Y
t –1
, b
t –1
  ƒ b2 Y1, b1  ƒ b1
ƒ Y1, , Yt , b1, , bt  = ƒ1 ƒ2
28
With unobserved heterogeneity we specify the hazard given u
which is the object of interest. In the absence of Granger non-causali-
ty, however, the observed hazard ƒ (Yt | Y
t–1, bt) does not only depend on
the sequence of hazards ƒ (Ys | Y
s–1, bs, u) up to t, but also on the se-
quence of distributions ƒ (bs | Y
s–1, bs–1, u) up to t. The link is made explicit
by the following expression:
or equivalently:
where F(u) is the cumulative distribution function of u.
III.2.2. Our log-likelihood with unobserved heterogeneity
A version of [III.1] allowing for unobserved heterogeneity is given by
In addition, we specify a logistic process for benefits as follows
The log-likelihood function takes the form
Lh = log ò  exp l1i q , u  + l2i g , u  dF uS
i=1
N
y  t, u = P b t  = 1 b t–1  = 1,T ³  t, xt , u  =
= F g 0 t  + g 1 t  xt  + g 2 t  u
f  t, u = F q 0 t  + q 1 t  b t  + q 2 t  xt  + q 3 t  b t  xt  + q 4 t  u
ƒ Yt Y
t–1
, b
t
 ƒ bt Y
t–1
, b
t–1P
t=1
t
P
t=1
t
 =
= ò  ƒ Yt Yt–1, bt, u  P
t–1
t
ƒ bt Y
t–1
, b
t–1
, u  dF u  P
t–1
t
ƒ Y
t
, b
t
 = ò  ƒ Yt , bt  u  dF u
ƒ Yt Y
t–1
, b
t
, u
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where
and
with bi0=1 for all i.
Finally, the variable u is assumed to be independent of x(t) f r all t,
and to have a discrete distribution with finite support given by {m1, m2, ...,
mJ} and associated probabilities p1, ..., pJ. This adds 2(J – 1) parameters
to the likelihood since the probabilities add up to one, and we assume
that E(u) = 0 given the presence of constant terms in the model.
l2i g , u= bi(t–1) bit log y i t, u + 1 – bit  log 1 – y i t, uS
t=1
Ti
0
l1i q , u=1 – ci log 1 – f i t, u  + ci log 1 – f i t, u  + log f i Ti
0
, uS
t=1
Ti
0–1
S
t=1
Ti
0
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IV
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We now estimate the influence on the hazard of leaving unemploy-
ment of individual characteristics, including whether the worker receives
benefits or not, and of the business cycle, while controlling for duration
dependence. We first discuss duration dependence, then take in turn the
effects of individual and business cycle variables, and follow with a dis-
cussion of the results allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. The section
ends with a comparison of the size of the effects of some variables and a
discussion of the implications for policy.
In order to check the robustness of the results, we estimate two al-
ternative specifications of the hazard equation [III.1]. In the first one,
economy-wide and sectoral determinants are captured by including
dummy variables, while in the second macroeconomic variables appear
directly. Furthermore, within each specification we report two alternative
ways to measure aggregate variables (as explained below). Regarding
individual characteristics, since the magnitudes of their coefficients are
quite similar across specifications, the comments that follow refer to both
of them. The qualitative impacts of the variables on the hazards are dis-
cussed in terms of the sign and statistical significance of the estimated
coefficients. The size of those impacts —discussed in the last sub-sec-
tion— is measured instead by the predicted effects of changes in the
variables on the hazards, which is the appropriate metric in view of both
the nonlinearity of the specification and the presence of terms of interac-
tion between variables.
IV.1. Duration dependence
As already mentioned, instead of imposing a given functional form,
we capture duration dependence in a very flexible way by introducing an
31
additive dummy variable for each monthly duration. For example, the
variable Dur 1 in Tables 1 and 2 is equal to 1 if the hazard corresponds to
a duration of unemployment of one month, and 0 otherwise. Similarly for
Dur 2 to Dur 14. Durations of more than 14 months are excluded, due to
their relatively small number of observations. Additional effects of dura-
tion are captured by introducing as regressors the interactions of certain
variables with logged duration (l g Dur).
The results indicate a non-monotonic duration dependence. The typi-
cal pattern of the predicted hazard is shown in Figure 5, for a given refer-
ence group (1). For workers without benefits, the predicted hazard is in-
creasing up to the third month and decreasing afterwards. This shape
results from the combined effects of the duration dummies and the inter-
actions of duration with other variables. We discuss these interactions be-
low. Here we just note that duration dependence is much less evident for
workers receiving benefits: as shown in the graph, after the third month
the hazard levels off, or falls mildly.
IV.2. Individual characteristics
IV.2.1. Unemployment benefits
It is quite evident from Figure 5 that the receipt of unemployment ben-
efits reduces the hazard of leaving unemployment. This is in agreement
with the theoretical prediction of the models introduced in section I. More-
over, the coefficient on the benefit variable is the single most significant
estimated effect in both tables and the one that produces the largest
change in the hazards. The reduction in the hazard falls as duration in-
creases (note the positive coefficient on Benefits x log Dur in the tables),
closing up after one year of unemployment.
There is an additional negative effect of benefits on the hazards of
workers aged 30 to 44 years old, relative to those in the two other age
groups (captured by Benefits x Age 30-44). Although it would be natural
to interpret this finding as the result of a particularly negative impact of
benefit receipt on the search intensity of mature workers, several points
should be kept in mind. First, in the comparison with young workers (20-
29 years old) this benefit effect is likely to be capturing as well the fact
that mature workers are usually entitled to higher amounts of benefits,
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( 1 ) Heads of household aged 30 to 44, with primary education, keeping aggregate
variables at their sample means, and using the estimated coefficients of the first specifica-
tion in Table 2.
given their higher employment seniority and number of dependants. Sec-
ond, with respect to older workers (45-64 years old) two points are rele-
vant (2). The expected relative amount of benefits is not obvious, since
older workers are likely to claim higher seniority but a lower number of
dependants (children are more likely to have left home). Also, since older
workers have lower hazards than mature workers when not receiving
benefits, it turns out that benefit receipt lowers the hazards in similar pro-
portions for the two groups (e.g. at 3-month duration, by 49 % for mature
workers and 42 % for older workers, cf. Figure 6 and Table A.III.1).
IV.2.2. Other characteristics
The estimated effects of other personal characteristics are quite intu-
itive. Starting with age, Figure 6 shows that —among benefit non-recipi-
ents— the hazards of mature workers are practically identical to those of
the young but quite higher than those of older workers. As a result of the
effect noted in the previous paragraph, mature workers show lower haz-
ards than the young, among benefit recipients (see Table A.III.1). There
is also evidence of negative duration dependence for older workers (cap-
tured by Age 45-64 x log Dur), which seems natural for workers near re-
tirement, though the effect is minor (presumably due to the presence of
the youngest workers in this age band).
As to education, holding a university degree increases the hazard
only at the beginning of a spell. After the third month, the presence of
negative duration dependence (captured by University education x log
Dur) reduces the hazards of college graduates below those of less edu-
cated workers, which presumably reflects the former’s higher reservation
wages. A secondary education degree does not raise the hazards signifi-
cantly. Lastly, being a head of household does increase the chances of
re-employment, with the effect diminishing over time (see Table A.III.1 for
both features).
IV.3. Business cycle
As explained in section I, search theory provides ambiguous predic-
tions on the sign of the relationship between the business cycle and re-
employment hazards, and the existing empirical results have also gone
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(2) We chose the starting age for the older group at 45 because the conditions for eli-
gibility to unemployment benefits are significantly relaxed at this age.
either way. On the other hand, Figure 1 suggests a positive relationship
in our data.
Aggregate effects are measured alternatively by dummies and
macroeconomic variables. In Table 1 they are captured by dummies: in
the first column by quarterly dummies, and in the third column by yearly
plus seasonal dummies. Since the results are very close, we focus on the
second alternative, which is easier to discuss. The yearly dummies are
significant —the reference year being 1987— and indicate that hazards
are higher for expansion years (1988-91) than for recession years (1992-94).
The latter set of dummies, however, is probably also capturing the
changes in the legislation in 1992-93 which made unemployment benefits
less generous overall. Additionally, the hazards appear to be higher in the
second and third quarters of the year.
There also appear to be significant differences in hazards across
sectors. Table A.III.1 shows, for workers without benefits, that the time
pattern of hazards is similar across sectors —maybe slightly flatter in
agriculture—, but the levels are quite different. The ordering of sectors
in terms of the hazard of finding a job, from highest to lowest, is: agri-
culture, construction, services, and industry. This order does not match
very well the ranking of the sectoral unemployment rates in Spain,
which over the sample period was: services (10.4 %), industry
( 1 1 . 5%), agriculture (13.4 %), and construction (20.4 %). In particular,
the two sectors with the lowest unemployment rates show the lowest
hazards of leaving unemployment, and vice versa. The puzzle is resolved
once we realize that we are only analyzing unemployment outflows
and ignoring inflows. The outflow ordering we have obtained is, on the
other hand, correlated with the sectoral ranking in terms of the propor-
tion of temporary employment, as described in section II. Thus we
shall include temporary employment rates by sector as explanatory
variables below.
Table 2 contains the estimates obtained when the dummies are replaced
by macroeconomic variables. The reference periods are as follows: in the first
column aggregate variables are measured by quarterly levels (e.g. sectoral
unemployment rate in 1988:II) and by rates of change from same quarter of
the previous year (e.g. D G D P1988:II = GDP1988:II — GDP1 9 8 7 : I I); in the third col-
umn all quarters in a given year are assigned the same yearly average level
(e.g. sectoral unemployment rate in 1988) and the same average yearly rate
of change (e.g. D G D P1988 = GDP1988 — GDP1 9 8 7). The results are again very
c l o s e .
The only economy-wide variable included is the rate of growth of
GDP. Figure 7 depicts the hazards for workers without benefits, evaluat-
ed at the sample mean values of the macroeconomic variables and for
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the same individual characteristics as in the previous figures. For com-
parison, the hazards are also plotted for the maximum and minimum sec-
ond-quarter GDP growth rates in the period: 5.4 % in 1988:II and –1.6 %
in 1993:II (3). The positive effect of GDP growth on the hazards is evi-
dent, although it dies out as time passes (note the negative coefficient on
GDP x log Dur).
We also introduce the following sectoral variables, which refer to the
job the worker held right before becoming unemployed: the unemploy-
ment rate, in levels and rates of change, and the temporary employment
rate. The level and the rate of change of the unemployment rate are in-
tended to measure sector-specific effects, while the interaction of the lat-
ter with individual duration should capture hysteresis mechanisms, as dis-
cussed in section I. The reason for including the temporary employment
rate was given above.
In Table 2, the sectoral unemployment rate shows the expected neg-
ative sign. Figure 8 gives an idea of size, by plotting the hazards for the
average, maximum, and minimum second-quarter sectoral unemploy-
ment rates in the sample period, for benefit non-recipients. The coeffi-
cient on the change in the sectoral unemployment rate is a composite
one. The constant term should be considered jointly with the other two
which capture the business cycle: GDP growth and the level of unem-
ployment. The interaction with benefits is significant, suggesting a reduc-
tion of benefit recipients’ search effort when the employment outlook be-
comes gloomier. The interaction with individual duration is negative and
significant, which can be interpreted as favorable evidence for the idea
that, when hiring, firms favor workers with lower duration. The separate
effect of this interacted term is shown in Figure 9, which reveals that
these hysteresis effects are not large (4).
Lastly, the sectoral temporary employment rate attracts the expected
positive sign and it is the most significant estimated aggregate effect. Its
impact, plotted in Figure 10, is shown to be relatively large (5).
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(3) The corresponding hazards for workers receiving benefits appear in Table A.III.1.
(4) Significant but small hysteresis effects were also found, in the context of wage set-
ting in Spanish manufacturing firms, by Bentolila and Dolado (1994).
(5) In order to capture the potential effect of a change of the legislation in 1992 in-
creasing the minimum length of fixed-term labor contracts, which may have made them less
attractive for employers, we included the interaction of the temporary employment rate with
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 from 1992:II on. Its coefficient was hardly significant,
so we have left it out.
IV.4. Unobserved heterogeneity
We now turn to the estimation of the model for the hazard of leaving
unemployment with unobserved heterogeneity presented in section III.2.
This model entails endogeneizing benefit receipt. Since it provides useful
complementary information, before presenting the joint estimates, we
briefly discuss the results of estimating a reduced form process for the
benefit receipt indicator alone.
We need not devote much effort to interpreting the estimates on ben-
efit receipt, since this is just an auxiliary reduced-form equation. Notice
that we are concerned, for the first month of unemployment, with the
probability that the worker is entitled to benefits upon becoming unem-
ployed, while at subsequent periods we have the probability that the
worker is entitled to benefits given that he has remained unemployed until
the current month and was entitled to benefits in the previous month. The
first probability depends on eligibility rules and the remaining ones on
benefit duration rules. Both types of rules, however, depend on the type
of benefits received. Eligibility to unemployment insurance depends only
on tenure in the previous job —since all individuals in our sample have
worked before—, while for unemployment assistance it depends on the
number of dependants, family income, and age (see Table A.I.1). Some
regressors are correlated with both rules in the same way. For example,
the worker’s age or being a head of household should be positively corre-
lated with eligibility to both UI and UA. But for other variables the signs
may differ. For example, the correlation between higher education and el-
igibility should be positive for UI (through longer employment tenure) but
negative for UA (through higher family income).
Table A.III.2 shows the results for a very general specification includ-
ing interactions of the regressors with unemployment duration (retaining
only the significant coefficients). We include as a regressor a step dummy
starting in April 1992, to capture the legal change increasing the stringen-
cy of UI eligibility (6). The results are quite intuitive, indicating that the
conditional probability of receiving benefits: (a) increases with age (after
the first month for workers aged 45-64), university education (after the
third month), and head of household status, (b) falls with the sectoral pro-
portion of temporary employment (after the first month), (c) is counter-
cyclical, and (d) fell in April 1992 for all workers. The observed counter-
cyclicality probably arises from the fact that the recession period in our
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(6) A dummy starting in April 1989 interacted with Age 45-64, meant to capture an ex-
tension of UA eligibility for that group of workers, was not significant. This was expected,
since the change mostly affected workers after having received UA benefits for at least 18
months, a duration which is absent in our data. Legislative changes in 1993 affected benefit
amounts but not eligibility rules.
sample was characterized by a shake-out of older, long-tenure workers
which firms intended to replace by younger workers on fixed-term con-
tracts in the subsequent expansion.
Estimates of the joint mixture log-likelihood for unemployment duration
and benefit receipt, as specified in equation [III.3], are contained in Table
3. We did not allow any interaction of the effect of the unobserved variable
u with duration. Thus, in terms of the notation of section III.2.2, the coeffi-
cients associated with u in the unemployment and benefits hazards are,
respectively, 4(t) = 1 and 2(t) = 2. Moreover, we specified a distribution
for u with two mass points, m1 and m2, with probabilities p1 and p2. How-
ever, since E(u) = 0, we are effectively introducing three additional free pa-
rameters in the model: m1, p1 and 2, which, together with the 35 parame-
ters in the unemployment hazard and the 32 parameters in the benefits
process, gives a total of 70 parameters in the mixture log-likelihood.
The results with and without unobserved heterogeneity are quite con-
sistent. All coefficients in Table 3 have the same sign and are of a similar
magnitude as those in Table 2. The only exception is the interaction of
Age 45-64 with duration, whose coefficient becomes insignificant and
very close to zero. Specifically, in Table 3 benefit receipt reduces the
hazard significantly, GDP growth and temporary employment raise it. The
coefficients on the jointly estimated equation for the benefit receipt indica-
tor also have the same sign and similar magnitude to those obtained
when it was estimated separately (Table A.III.2).
Lastly, the final panel in Table 3 shows that, of the two unobserved
types of workers we have allowed for, one is much more frequent (its
probability being 0.96), while the other, less frequent type has a much
higher constant hazard. More specifically, the estimate for m1 is –0.23
and the implied estimate for m2 is 5.49.
IV.5. Discussion of the results
We end this section by discussing the relative sizes of the effects of
several variables and the policy implications stemming from our results.
Among all the variables, we now focus on the most meaningful from an
economic point of view: unemployment benefits and macroeconomic vari-
ables. The sizes of the impacts of the remaining personal characteristics
are easily read off the corresponding graphs and tables. Comparisons of
size are not straightforward, because the exact magnitudes of the effects
depend on the reference group of individuals and the values of the
macroeconomic variables chosen for the evaluation. We discuss the re-
sults obtained for the particular values underlying the previous graphs,
which are broadly representative of our results.
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The relative importance of benefit receipt and GDP growth can be
gauged by comparing Figures 5 and 7. According to our estimates, a
change in the rate of growth of GDP from 2.3 % to –1.6 % (i.e. a 4-point
drop) reduces the predicted monthly hazard of finding a job for a worker not
receiving benefits by 4.3 percentage points, at most. In contrast, at 2.3 %
GDP growth, a comparable worker who does receive benefits has a month-
ly hazard which is lower by 7.4 to 10.7 percentage points in the first three
months of unemployment, and by 4.5 percentage points after six months.
Since the ceteris paribus clause may seem too strong for this comparison,
we have repeated the exercise for the case when the change in the GDP
growth rate comes along with the weighted average sectoral unemploy-
ment rate and its (yearly) rate of change observed in the same quarter.
Table A.III.1 shows that moving from the average to the minimum GDP
growth rate with the attached level and change in unemployment does not
reduce the hazards by more than 5 percentage points, a still remarkably
lower impact than that of benefit receipt. Furthermore, we are measuring
these differences taking a worker not claiming benefits as the baseline. The
differences would still be larger if we were to take a recipient as the refer-
ence, since in absolute terms recipients’ hazards are less affected by GDP
growth than those of non-recipients (see Table A.III.1).
We therefore conclude that, for assessing the chances of re-employ
ment of a given individual, it appears to be much more important to know
whether he is receiving benefits than the state of the business cycle.
Another interesting exercise refers to the effects of fixed-term con-
tracts. Figure 10 indicates that the predicted monthly hazard rates for the
same reference worker, who was previously working in a sector with a
temporary employment rate of 40 %, are 2 to 6 percentage points higher
than if he had been working in a sector with a temporary employment rate
of 18 %. The magnitude of the effect is not at all negligible.
An important caveat applies to the interpretation of the results con-
cerning duration dependence. In spite of controlling for observed worker
heterogeneity, we cannot be sure of the extent to which the pattern we
have found reflects true duration dependence. In general we expect a
part of the estimated duration dependence to stem from unobserved het-
erogeneity; in our case, for example, from differences in family income or
in the actual amount of benefits received and its time pattern. As is well
known, spurious duration dependence may arise from changes in the
composition of the stock of unemployed as time passes (7). We have al-
ready shown that, when unobserved heterogeneity of the type considered
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(7) Suppose, for instance, that there were two types of workers with different, but con-
stant, hazards. As the high-hazard workers disproportionately leave unemployment, the pro-
portion of the low-hazard ones in the remaining stock would increase, and this would show
up as negative duration dependence.
in section III.2 is allowed for, the estimated effects of the key variables of
interest do not vary much. Nevertheless, the basic identification problem
remains. As a result, more attention should be paid to the exit rates corre-
sponding to the first few months, since they are based on a more repre-
sentative sample. For the same reason, we prefer not to put much em-
phasis on the disparity between the shapes of duration dependence
found in the data and those predicted by the standard search model.
What policy implications can be derived from our results? Surely, the
policy goal should be to reduce the unemployment rate, rather than in-
creasing jobfinding rates per se. In the introduction we noted, though, that
Spanish unemployment is, as in many other European countries, chiefly
an outflow problem. This has manifested itself in a large share of long-
term unemployment. These facts make a prima facie case for policy mea-
sures aimed at increasing re-employment probabilities. Our empirical
findings indicate that lowering unemployment benefit durations would be
appropriate for this purpose (8). Clearly, the extent to which this measure
would translate into a reduction of the unemployment rate would depend
on two key links: how much would reservation wages fall in response to a
reduction in benefit duration and how much would labor demand increase
in response to the drop in reservation wages. We unfortunately lack em-
pirical evidence on these two elasticities. On the other hand, if negotiated
wage settlements preclude contracting below a certain wage level, a re-
duction in reservation wages may have little impact on re-employment
probabilities even if labor demand wage elasticities are high.
Moreover, policy decisions should be based on welfare assessments,
and it is not obvious that reducing benefit duration would necessarily in-
crease welfare. Unemployment benefits create both gains and losses.
The former come in the form of smoother consumption of households
with unemployed members (in the presence of risk aversion and incom-
plete private insurance against the unemployment risk) and of more effi-
cient worker-firm matches. The losses, apart from longer unemployment
duration and the resulting loss of human capital, may arise from lower
precautionary saving, leading to lower capital stock and output. As a re-
sult, the net welfare impact of a change in benefit duration would be diffi-
cult to assess, and no established evidence is yet available [see Valdivia
(1995)]. What our results show is that the desirable effects of benefits
have to be traded off against the undesirable outcome of significantly
larger unemployment durations.
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( 8 ) Note that lowering benefit duration may not only raise hazard rates from unem-
ployment but may also lower hazard rates into unemployment (not analyzed here), although
the international empirical evidence suggests that this effect is relatively small [see Atkinson
and Micklewright (1991)].
Lastly, the difference between affecting unemployment rates and un-
employment outflow probabilities mentioned before becomes especially
relevant in the case of fixed-term labor contracts. We have found that
these contracts have a sizable positive effect on the hazard of leaving un-
employment. On the other hand, they are almost sure to raise the hazard
of entering unemployment as well, thus raising the unemployment rate.
By providing workers with work habits and experience, and by mitigating
adverse duration dependence effects (especially for the long-term unem-
ployed), we could expect that the net effect of fixed-term contracts on the
unemployment rate would be positive. Establishing this conjecture, how-
ever, would require an empirical assessment of the dynamics of employ-
ment and unemployment spells, which is outside the scope of this paper.
Ultimately, any policy recommendation about temporary contracts cannot
be dissociated from those concerning the firing costs of the alternative
permanent labor contracts.
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VCONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have investigated empirically the influence of individ-
ual characteristics and the business cycle on the probability of finding a
job, with special emphasis on the effects of unemployment benefits. For
this purpose we have estimated monthly discrete hazard models using
duration data constructed from a rotating panel sample of unemployed
men in the Spanish Labor Force Survey, for the period 1987:II-1994:III.
Our main empirical results can be summarized as follows. (a) Receiv-
ing unemployment benefits reduces the hazard of leaving unemployment.
For example, at an unemployment duration of three months —when the
largest effects occur—, the hazard rate for workers without benefits
doubles the rate for those with benefits. (b) Hazard rates are procyclical.
(c) At sample-period magnitudes, receipt of unemployment benefits affects
an individual’s hazard of leaving unemployment to a significantly higher
degree than changes in the state of the business cycle. More specifically,
again at 3-month duration, the fall in the hazard caused by the receipt of
benefits is 2.5 times larger than the fall in the hazard due to a 4-point
drop in GDP growth. (d) There is hysteresis, since an increasing sectoral
unemployment rate reduces hazard rates more the longer is individual
unemployment duration, but this effect is small. And, (e) measures which
increase labor market flexibility —the introduction of fixed-term contracts
in the Spanish case— raise hazard rates from unemployment into em-
ployment.
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OF LOGISTIC HAZARDS.
MODEL WITH TIME AND SECTORAL DUMMIES (a)
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Benefits –1.245 25.34 –1.244 25.32
Benefits x log Dur 0.572 18.44 0.572 18.44
Benefits x Age 30-44 –0.182 4.40 –0.183 4.42
Age 30-44 0.030 0.91 0.030 0.94
Age 45-64 –0.434 7.20 –0.434 7.20
Age 45-64 x log Dur –0.210 5.47 –0.210 5.47
Secondary education 0.034 1.44 0.035 1.46
University education 0.290 2.32 0.286 2.29
University education x log Dur –0.221 2.48 –0.218 2.45
Head of household 0.496 9.92 0.496 9.91
Head of household x log Dur –0.153 4.67 –0.153 4.67
SECTORAL AND TIME DUMMIES:
Industry 0.152 2.21 0.149 2.17
Industry x log Dur –0.476 10.36 –0.475 10.34
Construction 0.310 5.25 0.308 5.22
Construction x log Dur –0.394 10.01 –0.393 9.99
Services –0.051 0.82 –0.053 0.85
Services x log Dur –0.334 8.15 –0.333 8.13
1988 — — 0.124 2.59
1989 — — 0.126 2.65
1990 — — 0.184 3.87
1991 — — 0.136 2.85
1992 — — –0.151 3.17
1993 — — –0.292 6.18
1994 — — –0.184 3.62
SEASONAL DUMMIES:
Second quarter — — 0.135 5.04
Third quarter — — 0.106 3.84
Fourth quarter — — 0.021 0.72
DURATION DUMMIES:
Dur 1 –2.749 27.19 –2.936 40.37
Dur 2 –1.933 20.53 –2.124 35.79
Dur 3 –1.308 14.28 –1.500 27.35
Dur 4 –1.220 13.28 –1.412 25.65
Dur 5 –1.394 14.61 –1.587 26.73
Dur 6 –1.434 14.65 –1.627 25.78
Dur 7 –1.293 13.03 –1.486 22.89
Dur 8 –1.496 14.43 –1.690 23.34
Dur 9 –1.495 13.85 –1.689 21.57
Dur 10 –1.352 12.35 –1.545 19.25
Dur 11 –1.685 14.02 –1.877 19.86
Dur 12 –1.812 13.68 –2.002 18.27
Dur 13 –1.694 12.63 –1.884 16.88
Dur 14 –2.130 13.03 –2.322 15.95
tCoeff.tCoeff.Variable
(a) In the first specification quarterly dummy variables (coefficients not reported) are included in pla-
ce of yearly and seasonal dummy variables.
Number of spells: 27,006.
Log-likelihood: First specification, –39,494.77; second specification, –39,506.77.
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATES OF LOGISTIC HAZARDS.
MODEL WITH AGGREGATE AND SECTORAL ECONOMIC VARIABLES (a)
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Benefits –1.262 25.57 –1.258 25.48
Benefits x log Dur 0.581 18.73 0.580 18.69
Benefits x Age 30-44 –0.185 4.45 –0.190 4.58
Age 30-44 0.030 0.92 0.030 0.94
Age 45-64 –0.479 8.00 –0.481 8.03
Age 45-64 x log Dur –0.168 4.42 –0.169 4.45
Secondary education 0.022 0.92 0.018 0.77
University education 0.320 2.60 0.314 2.56
University education x log Dur –0.266 3.05 –0.265 3.03
Head of household 0.505 10.13 0.504 10.11
Head of household x log Dur –0.164 5.03 –0.164 5.02
SECTORAL AND ECONOMY-WIDE VARIABLES:
D GDP 9.784 6.26 9.662 5.35
D GDP x log Dur –2.528 2.40 –2.733 2.25
Sectoral unemployment rate –2.366 9.72 –2.379 9.73
D Sectoral unemployment rate 0.557 2.65 0.462 1.83
D Sectoral unemployment rate x Benefits–0.667 5.79 –0.667 5.23
D Sectoral unemployment rate x log Dur–0.296 2.08 –0.320 1.87
Temporary employment rate 1.844 20.33 1.827 19.96
SEASONAL DUMMIES:
Second quarter 0.136 5.08 0.134 5.00
Third quarter 0.120 4.40 0.118 4.32
Fourth quarter 0.053 1.91 0.048 1.70
DURATION DUMMIES:
Dur 1 –2.874 61.42 –2.868 61.36
Dur 2 –2.280 58.89 –2.274 58.81
Dur 3 –1.773 50.06 –1.768 49.98
Dur 4 –1.768 48.73 –1.764 48.67
Dur 5 –2.013 49.41 –2.007 49.30
Dur 6 –2.104 46.76 –2.099 46.67
Dur 7 –2.008 43.32 –2.003 43.24
Dur 8 –2.258 41.53 –2.251 41.44
Dur 9 –2.285 37.50 –2.281 37.45
Dur 10 –2.172 34.82 –2.170 34.79
Dur 11 –2.548 32.40 –2.540 32.32
Dur 12 –2.695 28.23 –2.691 28.18
Dur 13 –2.597 26.73 –2.593 26.70
Dur 14 –3.059 22.74 –3.056 22.72
tCoeff.tCoeff.Variable
(a) Aggregate variables: In the first specification, they are measured by quarterly levels and by rates
of change from the same quarter of the previous year. In the second specification, all quarters in a given
year are assigned the same yearly aerage level and the same average yearly rate of change.
Number of spells: 27,006.
Log-likelihood: First specification, –39,581.02; ssecond specification, –39,598.94.
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TABLE 3
JOINT ESTIMATES OF LOGISTIC HAZARDS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT AND
BENEFITS WITH UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY (a)
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Benefits –1.288 15.93
Benefits x log Dur 0.594 12.43
Benefits x Edad 30-44 –0.199 4.50
Age 30-44 0.022 0.62
Age 45-64 –0.711 7.46
Age 45-64 x log Dur –0.043 0.77
Secondary education 0.023 0.91
University education 0.475 2.62
University education x log Dur –0.350 2.92
Head of household 0.680 8.86
Head of household x log Dur –0.260 5.60
SECTORAL AND ECONOMY-WIDE VARIABLES:
D  GDP 11.415 5.29
D  GDP x log Dur –3.468 2.53
Sectoral unemployment rate –2.823 10.26
D  Sectoral unemployment rate 0.480 1.62
D  Sectoral unemployment rate x Benefits –0.724 5.84
D  Sectoral unemployment rate x log Dur –0.222 1.18
Temporary employment rate 2.097 19.67
SEASONAL DUMMIES:
Second quarter 0.136 4.83
Third quarter 0.130 4.49
Fourth quarter 0.052 1.76
DURATION DUMMIES:
Dur 1 –3.931 13.07
Dur 2 –2.202 36.91
Dur 3 –1.566 27.15
Dur 4 –1.547 26.21
Dur 5 –1.787 28.74
Dur 6 –1.874 28.63
Dur 7 –1.775 26.56
Dur 8 –2.025 27.77
Dur 9 –2.050 26.18
Dur 10 –1.937 24.26
Dur 11 –2.312 24.78
Dur 12 –2.460 22.75
Dur 13 –2.362 21.50
Dur 14 –2.823 19.58
tCoeff.Variable
Hazard of leaving unemployment
(a) Aggregate variables are measured as in the first specification in Table 2.
Number of spells: 27,006.
Log-likelihood: –66,312.69.
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TABLE 3
JOINT ESTIMATES OF LOGISTIC HAZARDS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT AND
BENEFITS WITH UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY (contd.)
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Age 30-44 0.161 4.60
Age 30-44 x log Dur 0.110 2.52
Age 45-64 –0.028 0.68
Age 45-64 x log Dur 0.185 3.68
Secondary education –0.037 1.38
University education –0.301 3.99
University education x log Dur 0.236 2.09
Head of household 0.348 10.63
Head of household x log Dur 0.099 2.35
SECTORAL AND ECONOMY-WIDE VARIABLES:
D  GDP –2.314 2.07
Dummy 1992:II-1994:III –0.299 6.77
Sectoral unemployment rate 1.267 4.27
D  Sectoral unemployment rate 0.674 6.30
Temporary employment rate 0.226 2.07
Temp. employment rate x log Dur –0.401 3.60
SEASONAL DUMMIES:
Second quarter 0.045 1.44
Third quarter –0.022 0.71
Fourth quarter –0.014 0.44
DURATION DUMMIES:
Dur 1 –0.069 1.91
Dur 2 3.347 52.25
Dur 3 2.778 47.11
Dur 4 4.509 35.90
Dur 5 2.811 38.85
Dur 6 2.426 33.57
Dur 7 4.755 23.19
Dur 8 2.863 27.78
Dur 9 2.361 24.05
Dur 10 3.905 19.20
Dur 11 2.552 19.42
Dur 12 2.083 16.20
Dur 13 3.824 12.93
Dur 14 2.521 13.06
m1 –0.230 5.06
m2 5.486
p1 0.960 131.10
g 2 –0.174 7.82
tCoeff.Variable
Reduced form process for benefits
Heterogeneity coeffcients
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FIGURE 1
PROBABILITY OF FINDING A JOB AND GDP GROWTH
see chart 1
FIGURE 2
EMPIRICAL HAZARDS BY YEAR
see chart 2
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FIGURE 3
EMPIRICAL HAZARDS AND BENEFITS
see chart 3
FIGURE 4
EMPIRICAL HAZARDS AND BENEFITS
Age 30-44, construction, non-university education
see chart 4
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FIGURE 5
PREDICTED HAZARDS AND BENEFITS (a)
see chart 5
FIGURE 6
PREDICTED HAZARDS AND AGE
Not receiving benefits (a)
see chart 6
( a ) GDP rate of growth 2.3%, sectoral unemployment rate 14.87 %, rate of change of sectoral
unemployment rate 8,9%, and temporary employment 39.6 %.
(a) Primary education, industry, head of household, in 1989.
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FIGURE 7
PREDICTED HAZARDS AND GDP GROWTH
Not receiving benefits (a)
see chart 7
(a) Temporary employment 39.6 %, sectoral unemployment rate 14.87 %, and sectoral unemploy-
ment rate of change 8.9 %.
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FIGURE 8
PREDICTED HAZARDS AND SECTORAL UNEMPLOYMENT
Not receiving benefits (a)
see chart 8
(a) Temporary employment 39.6 %, GDP rate of growth 2.3 %, and sectoral unemployment rate of
change 8.9 %.
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FIGURE 9
HYSTERESIS EFFECTS OF THE CHANGE IN
SECTORAL UNEMPLOYMENT ON PREDICTED HAZARDS
Not receiving benefits (a)
see chart 9
(a) Temporary employment 39.6 %, GDP rate of growth 2.3 %, sectoral unemployment rate 14.87 %
and sectoral unemployment rate of change 8.9 %.
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FIGURE 10
PREDICTED HAZARDS AND TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT
Not receiving benefits (a)
see chart 10
(a) Sectoral unemployment rate 14.87 %, GDP rate of growth 2.3 %, and sectoral unemployment
rate of change 8.9 %.
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TABLE A.I.1
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
1-5 m 0 1-6 m 80 % None 170 %
6-48 m Tenure/2 (b) 7-12 m 70 % 1 child 195 %
> 48 m 24 months 13-24 m 60 % > 1 child 220 %
1-11 m 0 1-6 m 70 %
12-72 m Tenure/3 (c) 7-12 m 60 % Same as above
> 72 m 24 m 13-24 m 60 %
APPENDIX I
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS IN SPAIN
Maximum length
1984
1992
Amount Maximum amount
Tenure Length Length % Wage (a) Dependants % Min w
Notes: m=months.
(a) Previous wage (average of last 6 months).
(b) Lengths have to be multiples of 3, so the actual formula is: 3 x integer (tenure/6).
(c) The actual formula is: 2 x integer (tenure/6), so that the length is an even number.
TABLE A.I.2
UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
1-2 m 0
3-5 m Tenure 75 % of the minimum wage
> 5 m 18 months
1-2 m 0
3-5 m Tenure
Age< 45 75 % Min. w
Age < 45 18 m
1 dep. 75 % min. w
6-11 m
Age ‡ 45 24 m Age ‡ 45 2 deps. 100 % min. w
Age < 45 24 m
> 2 deps. 125% min. w
> 12 m
Age ‡ 45 30 (a)
Maximum length
1984
1989
Amount
Tenure Length
Note: deps.=dependants.
(a) Plus 6 additional months if they have received contributory benefits for 24 months.
60
APPENDIX II
DATABASE DESCRIPTION
A) Individual data
Source. Rotating panel from the Spanish Labor Force Surveys (En -
cuesta de Población Activa: Estadística de Flujos) from 1987:II to
1994:III, provided by the National Statistical Office [Instituto Nacional de
Estadística (INE)].
Sample. From a sample of men of 20 to 64 years of age we exclude
those
— in the military or the substitute civil service
— always employed during the observed period
— never in the labor force during the observed period
— observed only once
— with a missing interview in between two valid interviews — who
have never worked and are not looking for work
— who are full-time students (from the moment they become so)
— employed who do not answer the question about how long they
have been in their current job
— unemployed (and those not in the labor force) who answer neither
the question “How long has it been since your last job?” nor the
question “How long have you been looking for a job?”
— unemployed who do not answer the question about their relation
with the public employment office (INEM)
— unemployed for over eight years.
60,036 unemployment spells satisfy these restrictions. Restricting the
sample to those unemployed observed when entering unemployment
leaves 27,382 spells of unemployment. Finally, at the estimation stage
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we drop 376 spells (1.37 %) for which the information on economic sector
at the previous job is lacking.
Unemployment duration. Both the unemployment and the benefit du-
ration variables are measured in months, the smallest unit allowed by the
data. The length of unemployment spells is determined using quarterly
observations on the individual’s labor market status. We start from the in-
formation provided the first time he answers the question “How long has it
been since your last job?” or the question “How long have you been look-
ing for a job?”. For subsequent quarters, unemployment duration is com-
puted as initial duration plus three months, instead of taking the actual re-
ply because sometimes it led to inconsistent sequences. Although these
inconsistencies may arise from very short-term employment spells, de-
tailed analysis of the data reveals that they are much more likely due to
measurement error (note that sometimes a single person answers the
survey for all household members). To determine the end of the unem-
ployment spell we use the answer to the question “How long have you
been in the current job?” given by those who are unemployed at one in-
terview and employed at the next.
Benefit duration. Benefit duration is constructed assuming that bene-
fits are received throughout, up to the last time the individual declares to
be receiving them (from a question about his relation with the employ-
ment office). Alternatively, we could have accepted the raw quarterly in-
formation on benefit receipt. An advantage of the former, smoother mea-
sure is that it overcomes the measurement error arising from the fact that
individuals often start receiving benefits with some (varying) delay due to
administrative reasons (1). In any case, for 87 % of our sample of en-
trants into unemployment the difference between the two measures is
non-existent and for over 97 % the difference is of three months at most.
If an individual is unemployed and receiving benefits at one interview and
employed at the next, we assume his benefits duration to be at least as
large as his unemployment duration.
The following dummy variables used in the estimation are taken at
their values at the beginning of the unemployment spell:
Economic sector at the previous job. Grouped as agriculture (includ-
ing farming and fishing), industry (including mining and manufacturing),
construction, and services.
E d u c a t i o n . Three groups: Illiterate, no schooling, and primary education;
Secondary education and vocational training; and University education.
(1) An official document reports that this delay was of 18 days as of May 1993, and
that it had been longer in previous years (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1993).
Age. The available five-year age bands are grouped further into three
categories: 20 to 29 years old, 30 to 44 years old, and 45 to 64 years old.
Head of household. The variable takes the value of 1 for heads of
households and 0 otherwise.
Table A.II.1 provides the frequencies of the individual variables for the
sample of 27006 entrants into unemployment that is used in the estima-
tion. Note that monthly frequencies show troughs at multiples of 3, in both
unemployment and benefit duration. The reason is that at the first inter-
view after workers become unemployed, most reply having been unem-
ployed for 1 or 2 months. Fewer reply 3 months and hardly anybody
replies 0 months. These troughs naturally translate to our estimated haz-
ards. Table A.II.2 gives the frequencies of a set of individual variables de-
pending on whether workers receive benefits or not.
B) Aggregate and sectoral variables
Proportion of temporary workers. Percentage of employees on fixed-
term contracts. Source: Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA), INE.
Unemployment rate. Source: EPA and Series Revisadas EPA (1977-
1987), INE.
Gross domestic product. Constant prices. Source: Cuentas Fi -
nancieras de la Economía Española (1985-1994), Banco de España.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A.II.3.
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TABLE A.II.1
FREQUENCIES OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
Sample of entrants into unemployment
Total number of spells 27,006 100.00
Censored 14,625 54.15
Non censored 12,381 45.85
DURATION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT SPELL:
1 month 4,255 15.76
2 months 3,986 14.76
3 months 2,764 10.23
4 months 3,540 13.11
5 months 2,831 10.48
6 months 1,199 4.44
7 months 1,923 7.12
8 months 1,595 5.91
9 months 580 2.15
10 months 1,072 3.97
11 months 924 3.42
12 months 256 0.95
13 months 578 2.14
14 months 589 2.18
15 months 144 0.53
16 months 407 1.51
17 months 363 1.34
CENSORED DURATION OF BENEFITS:
No benefits 13,464 49.86
1 month 1,594 5.90
2 months 1,988 7.36
3 months 1,229 4.55
4 months 1,988 7.36
5 months 1,650 6.11
6 months 644 2.38
7 months 1,072 3.97
8 months 860 3.18
9 months 305 1.13
10 months 563 2.08
11 months 492 1.82
12 months 131 0.49
13 months 292 1.08
14 months 275 1.02
15 months 73 0.27
16 months 201 0.74
17 months 185 0.69
HEAD-OF-HOUSEHOLD STATUS:
Head of household 14,175 52.49
Not head of household 12,831 47.51
PercentageNumber
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TABLE A.II.1
FREQUENCIES OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
(contd.)
AGE:
20 to 29 years old 11,131 41.22
30 to 44 years old 8,334 30.86
45 to 64 years old 7,541 27.92
EDUCATION:
Primary education or less 16,545 61.26
Secondary education 9,680 35.84
University education 781 2.89
ECONOMIC SECTOR AT PREVIOUS JOB:
Primary 5,811 21.52
Construction 7,887 29.20
Industry 5,029 18.62
Services 8,279 30.66
YEAR (a):
1987 2,282
1988 3,824
1989 4,112
1990 4,364
1991 4,423
1992 4,941
1993 5,975
1994 4,503
PercentageNumber
(a) Number of people who are unemployed in at least one month of the corresponding year (percent-
ages not shown due to overlap among years).
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TABLE A.II.2
FREQUENCIES OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES ACCORDING TO BENEFIT
RECEIPT (%)
AGE:
Age 20-29 37.26 45.19
Age 30-44 33.64 28.07
Age 45-64 29.10 26.74
EDUCATION:
Primary education or less 63.88 58.63
Secondary education 33.75 37.95
University eduation 2.37 3.42
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD STATUS:
Head of household 57.24 47.71
Not head of household 42.76 52.29
ECONOMIC SECTOR AT PREVIOUS JOB:
Primary 22.17 20.86
Construction 31.10 27.30
Industry 19.86 17.38
Services 26.88 34.45
Not receiving
benefitsReceiving benefits
TABLE A.II.3
SAMPLE STATISTICS OF ECONOMIC VARIABLES
ACROSS SPELLS (%)
SECTORAL VARIABLES:
Temporary employment rate 39.28 14.50 10.98 60.49
Unemployment rate (level) 14.70 5.93 7.99 31.50
Unemployment rate (rate of change) 8.26 18.14 –36.30 60.00
NATIONAL VARIABLES:
Gross domestic product (rate of change) 2.31 2.38 –1.59 6.13
Max.Min.St. dev.Mean
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TABLE A.III.1
PREDICTED HAZARDS FOR DIFFERENT POPULATION GROUPS
AND AGGREGATE VARIABLES’ VALUES (a)
Age 20-29 3.7 13.1 12.7 11.9 5.7
(with benefits) 30-44 3.2 11.4 11.1 10.3 4.9
45-64 2.4 7.2 5.9 5.1 2.2
Education Primary 11.9 22.3 14.6 11.4 4.6
(without benefits) Secondary 12.3 22.9 15.0 11.8 4.7
University 15.3 23.1 13.0 9.4 3.5
Head of household Not h. of h. 7.6 17.1 12.3 10.0 4.2
(without benefits) H. of h. 11.9 22.3 14.6 11.4 4.6
Sector Agriculture 10.4 29.4 27.1 24.9 12.6
(without benefits) Construction 13.7 26.9 19.0 15.4 6.5
Industry 11.9 22.3 14.6 11.4 4.4
Services 10.0 21.5 15.6 12.7 5.4
GDP growth –1.6 % 1.7 8.6 10.3 10.5 5.4
(with benefits) 2.3 % 2.5 11.0 12.2 12.0 6.1
5.4 % 3.4 13.3 13.9 13.4 6.7
Cycle (b) Recession 7.0 16.8 12.4 10.3 4.3
(without benefits) Average 9.9 21.7 16.0 13.2 5.6
Expansion 13.1 26.3 19.1 15.6 6.6
APENDIX III
ADDITIONAL EMPIRICAL RESULTS
1410731
Unempl. duration (months)
GroupVariable
(a) Source: Table 2, first specification.
(b) Definitions (u = sectoral unmeployment, all variables in percentages):
D GDP u D u
Recession –1.6 19.2 35.0
Average 2.3 14.9 8.9
Expansion 5.4 12.4 –1.2
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TABLE A.III.2
ESTIMATES OF THE REDUCED FORM PROCESS FOR BENEFITS
WITHOUT UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY (a)
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Age 30-44 0.156 4.51
Age 30-44 x log Dur 0.111 2.57
Age 45-64 –0.029 0.72
Age 45-64 x log Dur 0.184 3.68
Secondary education –0.038 1.41
University education –0.298 3.98
University education x log Dur 0.234 2.07
Head of household 0.345 10.62
Head of household x log Dur 0.101 2.41
SECTORAL AND ECONOMY-WIDE VARIABLES:
D  GDP –2.186 1.97
Dummy 1992:II-1994:III –0.281 6.40
Sectoral unmeployment rate 1.164 3.95
D  Sectoral unemployment rate 0.667 6.27
Temporary employment rate 0.257 2.36
Temp. employment rate x log Dur –0.404 3.63
SEASONAL DUMMIES:
Second quarter 0.040 1.30
Third quarter –0.023 0.73
Fourth quarter –0.015 0.49
DURATION DUMMIES:
Dur 1 –0.069 1.91
Dur 2 3.371 52.88
Dur 3 2.813 48.14
Dur 4 4.545 36.26
Dur 5 2.847 39.58
Dur 6 2.462 34.27
Dur 7 4.791 23.38
Dur 8 2.899 28.22
Dur 9 2.398 24.49
Dur 10 3.941 19.39
Dur 11 2.588 19.73
Dur 12 2.119 16.51
Dur 13 3.860 13.06
Dur 14 2.558 13.26
tCoeff.Variable
( a ) Aggregate variables are measured by quarterly levels and by rates of change from the same
quarter of the previous year.
Number of spells: 27,006.
Log-likelihood: –26,748.57.
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